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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Following a jury trial, Jesse Eugene Mann was convicted of trafficking in 
marijuana and two misdemeanor offenses for driving without privileges and possession 
of drug paraphernalia. Mr. Mann asserts two errors on appeal. First, he argues that the 
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the search of a 
rental car. Second, Mr. Mann argues that the district court erred by improperly 
instructing the jury on one of the elements for the offense of possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Mann committed the crime of 
trafficking in marijuana, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(B) (five to twenty-
five pounds). (R., pp.12–13.) This allegation arose out of a traffic stop of a rental car 
driven by Mr. Mann. (R., p.8.) Mr. Mann was arrested for driving without privileges, and 
the police’s inventory search of the vehicle found marijuana and “a marijuana bong.” 
(R., p.8.) The case was consolidated with ISP0314584, which contained two 
misdemeanor citations for driving without privileges, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A(1). (R., pp.11, 15.)  
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause and bound 
Mr. Mann over to district court. (R., pp.27–29; see also R., pp.70–76 (Def.’s Ex. F, 
preliminary hearing transcript).) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Mann with 
trafficking in marijuana, driving without privileges, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.34–35.) For possession of drug paraphernalia, the State charged: 
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That the defendant, JESSE EUGENE MANN, on or about the 8th 
day of February, 2015, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did use 
and/or possess with the intent to use drug paraphernalia, to wit: a bong or 
pipe used to introduce into the human body a controlled substance, all of 
which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case 
made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the 
State of Idaho.  
 
(R., p.35.)  
Mr. Mann filed a Motion and Memorandum to Suppress and Dismiss, arguing the 
evidence found in the rental car must be suppressed because the police officer who 
conducted the traffic stop did not have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation and the 
subsequent search did not fall under any exception to the warrant requirement. 
(R., pp.46–55.) The State responded in opposition, including an argument that 
Mr. Mann did not have standing1 to challenge the search of the rental car. (R., pp.85–
98.)  
The district court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally Tr., p.7, L.1–p.64, 
L.9; R., pp.99–102). The district court took up the issue of standing first. (Tr., p.7, L.7–
p.37, L.15.) Mr. Mann testified. (Tr., p.9, L.14–p.23, L.6.) The district court ruled 
Mr. Mann did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car, which was 
rented by his “living as married” partner of five years, Ashley Cheney. (Tr., p.10, L.22–
p.11, L.2, p.29, L.2–p.32, L.10.) The district court reasoned that the lack of standing 
resolved all issues raised in Mr. Mann’s motion to suppress. (Tr., p.36, Ls.15–20.) Thus, 
                                            
1 As noted by the Court of Appeals in State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 2006), 
“[T]he word ‘standing’ is technically inaccurate.” Id. at 716 n.2. “Nevertheless, the term 
is often employed as useful shorthand referring to whether the defendant had a privacy 
interest in a place that was searched such that he or she is entitled to the exclusion of 




the district court did not address whether the search of the rental car was lawful under 
the Fourth Amendment. Then, after a brief recess, the district court reopened the matter 
to determine whether the initial traffic stop was lawful. (Tr., p.37, L.17–p.63, L.23.) Idaho 
State Police (“ISP”) Trooper Clark and Mr. Mann testified, and a video of the stop was 
admitted into evidence. (Tr., p.40, L.7–p.60, L.4; State’s Ex. 1.) The district court found 
Mr. Mann credible, but Trooper Clark “more credible” as to the purpose for the traffic 
stop—Mr. Mann’s failure to signal for at least five seconds. (Tr., p.61, L.6–p.63, L.1.) 
The district court then ruled the traffic stop was lawful because Trooper Clark had a 
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. (Tr., p.61, L.6–p.63, L.23.) The district court 
entered on Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress “for the reasons stated on 
the record.” (R., p.103.) 
Mr. Mann proceeded to trial. (R., pp.143–167; see generally Tr., p.70, L.1–p.269, 
L.20.) Trooper Clark testified that he found on the front passenger seat what he 
believed to be a glass bong “with a burnt residue in one end” that smelled like “burnt 
marijuana.” (Tr., p.118, Ls.7–17, p.120, Ls.6–23; see also State’s Ex. 2.) Trooper Clark 
did not smell any burnt or raw marijuana while standing on the side of the road during 
the traffic stop, however. (Tr., p.131, Ls.18–23.) Next to the bong, Trooper Clark also 
found “a pipe cleaning tool, a small rubber container which seemed to have a residue or 
resin inside, and a plastic bag with a brown-like substance in it.” (Tr., p.118, Ls.18–21.) 
In the trunk, Trooper Clark found eight heat-sealed bags of marijuana. (Tr., p.122, Ls.5–
17 (Trooper Clark testimony), p.194, L.10–p.198, L.19 (ISP forensic scientist 
testimony).) The State did not introduce any evidence that the residue found in the bong 
was from an illegal substance.  
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After the State submitted its case in chief, Mr. Mann moved pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29 for acquittal on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. 
(Tr., p.208, L.18–p.209, L.10.) He argued that the State must prove he intended to use 
the bong in Idaho, and the State failed to present sufficient evidence of intent. 
(Tr., p.208, L.18–p.209, L.10, p.211, Ls.2–17.) The State disagreed, arguing that it 
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent. (Tr., p.210, Ls.4–12.) The district 
court denied Mr. Mann’s motion and ruled:  
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 408 doesn’t mention anything about where 
the defendant needs to intend to use the paraphernalia. The paraphernalia 
has to be found in the state of Idaho, but the defendant need not intend to 
use it here in the state of Idaho, and I think there is more than enough 
circumstantial evidence . . . . 
 
(Tr., p.212, Ls.13–18.) The defense rested shortly after this ruling. (Tr., p.213, L.20; 
p.241, L.24.)  
The district court instructed the jury. (Tr., p.215, L.1–p.226, L.4.) The jury 
instruction for possession of drug paraphernalia, Instruction No. 12h, provided: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, the state must prove each of the following: 
 
1. On or about 8th day of February, 2015 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant JESSE EUGENE MANN possessed a bong or pipe, 
intending 
4. to use it to introduce into the human body a controlled substance. 
 
 If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty.  
 
(R., p.191; Tr., p.219, L.24–p.220, L.9 (Instruction No. 12h read to jury).) During closing 
argument, Mr. Mann attempted to argue that there was no evidence he intended to use 
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the bong in Idaho. (Tr., p.248, L.12–p.249, L.11.) The State objected to Mr. Mann’s 
argument, and the district court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.249, Ls.12–25.) After the 
jury was sent out for deliberations, the district court reiterated that “where the defendant 
intended to use the paraphernalia . . . was not relevant to this case” and “intent to use” 
in Idaho was not an element of the offense. (Tr., p.258, L.19–p.259, L.1.)  





#3–4 “intending to use” 
 
Does this matter: 
 
1) defendant intended to use himself? 
 
2) or use in Idaho? Or elsewhere 
 
3) is there evidence of tested residue to indicate use? 
 
Please provide the applicable law in writing. 
 
(Aug. R., p.1 (capitalization and underline in original).) For the jury’s question 1, the 
district court instructed the jury to “follow the jury instructions.” (Tr., p.264, Ls.1–4.) For 
the jury’s question 3, the district court instructed the jury to “follow your recollection of 
the evidence.” (Tr., p.264, Ls.5–8.) The district court wrote these instructions directly on 
the jury’s question. (Aug. R., p.1.) For the jury’s question 2, the district court provided a 
supplemental instruction to the jury:  
Instruction No. 21 
You are instructed that any possession of paraphernalia must occur 
in Idaho. 
 If you find defendant possessed paraphernalia in Idaho, you must 
consider whether the defendant intended to use the paraphernalia. It does 
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not matter in which state the defendant formed the intent to use the 
paraphernalia.  
 
(R., p.202; Tr., p.264, Ls.9–18.) Mr. Mann objected to this instruction. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1–
7.) He argued that the instruction eliminated “any jurisdictional requirement that adds to 
the crime.” (Tr., p.263, Ls.5–7.)  
The jury returned a guilty verdict for trafficking in marijuana, driving without 
privileges, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.203; Tr., p.265, L.9–p.266, 
L.13.) For trafficking in marijuana, the district court sentenced Mr. Mann to the 
mandatory minimum of three years fixed, plus four years indeterminate. (R., pp.210–11; 
Tr., p.278, L.1–p.294, L.22 (sentencing hearing).) Mr. Mann filed a timely Notice of 




I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mann’s motion to suppress? 
 
II. Did the district court err when it failed to instruct the jury that the State had to 










Mr. Mann asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 
based on its determination that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the rental 
car. In State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals adopted a 
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether an unauthorized driver has a 
privacy interest in a rental car. Mr. Mann submits that the Court should modify the Cutler 
test and adopt the approach from Judge Lansing’s concurring opinion. Alternatively, if 
the Court reaffirms Cutler, Mr. Mann contends that the totality of the circumstances 
establishes his privacy interest in the rental car. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 
584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless 
they are clearly erroneous.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous if they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. 
Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. “At a suppression 
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” Ellis, 155 Idaho at 
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587. The Court exercises free review over the “application of constitutional principles in 
light of those facts.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. 
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Ruled Mr. Mann Did Not Have A Reasonable 
Expectation Of Privacy In The Rental Car  
 
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from 
unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article 
I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 
884, 886 (2015) (alteration in original). Under the United States and Idaho Constitutions, 
“[w]arrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable . . . unless they 
come within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 886–
87 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114 
Idaho 293, 295 (1988)).  
A threshold issue to challenge an unlawful search is standing. “A person 
challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the item or place searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 
626 (2008). The determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy involves a two-
part inquiry:  “(1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of 
the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable?” Id.  
In the rental car context, the Court of Appeals uses a totality of circumstances 
test to determine whether an unauthorized driver has a reasonable expectation of 
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privacy in the car. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275. The Court of Appeals rejected a bright-line 
rule, such as the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit’s rule that an unauthorized driver never 
has standing or the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s rule that an unauthorized driver has 
standing only if he can show that he had permission from the authorized driver. Id. at 
274. Instead, the Court of Appeals adopted the test from the Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2001). Cutler, 144 Idaho at 274–75. Like the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit also had a general rule that an 
unauthorized driver did not have standing. Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. But the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the government’s argument that the rental agreement alone controls whether a 
driver is authorized. Id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a “rigid test” was “inappropriate.” 
Id. Looking at a number of factors, the Smith Court held that an unauthorized driver had 
standing even though his use of the rental car was a breach of the rental agreement. Id. 
at 586–87. The Court of Appeals in Cutler adopted the Sixth Circuit’s approach—
generally “unauthorized drivers lack standing,” but the totality of the circumstances can 
overcome that presumption. 144 Idaho at 275–76. 
  
1. The Cutler Test Should Be Modified To Allow For An Unauthorized Driver 
With The Lessee’s Permission To Maintain A Privacy Interest In The 
Vehicle  
 
In a concurring opinion in Cutler, Judge Lansing wrote in support of a test that 
combines the Sixth Circuit’s totality of the circumstances test and the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuit’s exception for an unauthorized driver with permission. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 276 
(Lansing, J., concurring). Judge Lansing stated that an unauthorized driver’s permission 
“from the lessee” or other “contractually authorized driver” would be sufficient to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id. Otherwise, the general 
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rule applies—the unauthorized driver lacks standing. Id. In “extraordinary 
circumstances,” however, Judge Lansing wrote that an unauthorized driver may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy “in the absence of direct permission.” Id. These 
“extraordinary” circumstances persuaded Judge Lansing to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s 
totality of the circumstances test with a “heavy burden” on the driver to show the 
existence of other factors establishing a privacy interest. Id. Under Judge Lansing’s 
approach, an unauthorized driver with either permission or other “rare” circumstances 
could establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.  
Mr. Mann submits that the Court should reconsider Cutler and adopt Judge 
Lansing’s modified totality of the circumstances test. “Stare decisis requires that th[e] 
Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly wrong, has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is necessary to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. 
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5 (2015). The majority opinion and Judge Lansing’s 
concurrence both start with the general presumption that “unauthorized drivers of rental 
vehicles do not enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in such vehicles.” 144 Idaho at 
275–76; id. at 276 (Lansing, J., concurring). Both allow this presumption to be overcome 
by the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 275 (majority opinion); id. at 276 (Lansing, J., 
concurring). The majority’s test considers a number of factors, but not one factor is 
dispositive. Id. at 275 (majority opinion). Judge Lansing’s test considers these factors as 
well, but one particular factor if present—permission by lessee—is dispositive. Id. at 276 
(Lansing, J., concurring). Mr. Mann submits that this test should control. 
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Allowing an unauthorized driver to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy 
with the lessee’s permission is consistent with the standing analysis for other non-owner 
drivers. At its core, the question of standing rests on whether the person has a 
possessory right or ownership interest in the vehicle. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 148 (1978) (search of vehicle did not violate Fourth Amendment rights of 
passengers who asserted neither a property nor possessory interest in vehicle); State v. 
Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92 (1981) (defendant standing outside a parked car lacked 
privacy interest when no evidence showed that he “owned or had a right to possess” the 
car); State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780 (Ct. App. 1998). However, mere possession 
or ownership alone is not determinative. Foldesi, 131 Idaho at 780–81; State v. Hanson, 
142 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 2006). As such, a non-owner cannot establish a privacy 
interest in a vehicle by mere possession. Hanson, 142 Idaho at 719. But a non-owner’s 
possession coupled with authorization from the owner or a person believed to have 
authority is sufficient to confer standing. Id. The same principle should apply to lessees 
and unauthorized drivers. Once the rental agreement is executed, the lessee becomes 
the equivalent of the owner of the vehicle or, at the very least, a person believed to have 
authority over the vehicle. Therefore, a non-owner’s possession, coupled with the 
lessee’s authorization for the non-owner to use the vehicle, should be sufficient to 
establish the non-owner’s privacy interest in the vehicle, even if the non-owner is an 
unauthorized driver. See United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).  
In this case, there is no dispute that Mr. Mann had permission of the lessee to 
drive the vehicle. Mr. Mann testified that his “living as married partner” of five years, 
Ms. Cheney, knew he would be driving the rental vehicle. (Tr., p.10, L.22–p.11, L.9, 
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p.11, Ls.16–18.) She helped him pack for the trip, filled up the car with gas, and gave 
him the keys. (Tr., p.11, L.22–p.13, L.4.) She also knew of his travel destination. 
(Tr., p.12, Ls.11–14.) Moreover, the State acknowledged that Mr. Mann had 
Ms. Cheney’s permission. (Tr., p.26, Ls.20–21.) In light of the undisputed fact that 
Mr. Mann had the lessee’s permission to drive the car, Mr. Mann asserts that he has 
satisfied the modified Cutler test as set forth by Judge Lansing to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 
 
2. In The Alternative, The Facts Are Sufficient For Mr. Mann To Establish A 
Privacy Interest In The Rental Car Under Cutler’s Totality Of The 
Circumstances Test 
 
If the Court declines to adopt Judge Lansing’s approach, Mr. Mann asserts that 
the facts of this case satisfy Cutler’s totality of the circumstances test. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Mann asserts that the district court erroneously applied 
the Cutler test by requiring he satisfy the same five factors used in Smith. When the 
Court of Appeals adopted the Smith test, the Court of Appeals identified the five factors 
specifically considered by the Sixth Circuit: 1) whether the defendant had a driver’s 
license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (3) the 
driver’s ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver had the lessee’s 
permission to use the car; and (5) the driver’s relationship with the rental company. 
Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275; Smith, 263 F.3d at 586–87. The Court of Appeals’ discussion 
of the Smith factors, however, was not intended to require that each and every factor be 
met to establish an expectation of privacy. That rigid application of the test would be 
inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ rationale for adopting the Sixth Circuit’s test. The 
Court of Appeals reasoned, “Given the increasingly common utilization of rental vehicles 
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for a myriad of purposes and our view that a bright line rule fails to address the ensuing 
complexities, we are convinced the Sixth Circuit Court’s totality of the circumstances 
approach best addresses the issue.” Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275. Thus, the Smith factors 
only provide guidance, and the factors do not take precedence over other relevant facts 
in the case. In this case, the district court examined the five factors and found that none 
were satisfied except permission. (Tr., p.29, L.6–p.32, L.10.) Thus, the district court 
concluded that “under the five Cutler factors the totality of the circumstances tilt in favor 
of no standing.” (Tr., p.30, Ls.20–22.) Mr. Mann submits that the district court erred by 
requiring that he satisfy each factor instead of examining the totality of the 
circumstances.  
Given all the facts here, the totality of the circumstances establishes that 
Mr. Mann had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. The most relevant 
facts are Mr. Mann’s permission to drive the rental car and his marriage-like relationship 
with Ms. Cheney. Mr. Mann and Ms. Cheney lived together for five years, and they have 
one child together. (Tr., p.10, L.24–p.11, L.2, p.21, L.16–p.22, L.4.) They acted as a 
married couple in all respects, such as (a) sharing all living expenses, (b) making all 
parenting decisions together, (c) claiming Mr. Mann as a “dependent” on Ms. Cheney’s 
health insurance, (d) having renter’s insurance together, and (e) claiming Mr. Mann 
“under Ms. Cheney’s life insurance policy.” (Tr., p.18, L.12, p.19, L.11–p.21, L.15.) 
Although they did not have a marriage certificate, Mr. Mann and Ms. Cheney’s 
relationship was the equivalent of a marriage. Mr. Mann’s permission to drive the rental 
car from his partner Ms. Cheney was sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the rental car. 
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In light of the strength of the permission and relationship factors, Mr. Mann 
submits that the remaining Smith factors carry little weight in the overall standing 
analysis. First, Mr. Mann’s suspended license should not diminish his expectation of 
privacy. Whether an unauthorized driver has a driver’s license should be afforded 
minimal significance because drivers in general do not lose standing to challenge 
unlawful searches simply for failing to have a driver’s license. See, e.g., Arizona v. 
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (determining legality of warrantless search of vehicle 
when driver arrested for suspended license); State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868 (Ct. App. 
2012) (determining legality of inventory search of vehicle when driver arrested for 
suspended license). Second, the absence of evidence on Mr. Mann’s presentation of 
rental documents or his relationship with rental car company is also minimally relevant. 
Cf. United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding lessee with 
possession and control of rental car had reasonable expectation of privacy even though 
lease period had expired). These factors should be less significant when the 
unauthorized driver has the lessee’s permission and an established relationship with the 
lessee. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court erred by 
concluding Mr. Mann did not have standing to challenge the warrantless search of the 
rental car.  
Assuming Mr. Mann prevails on the standing issue on appeal, he submits that a 
remand is necessary to resolve the other issues raised in his suppression motion. 
Specifically, the district court did not address the constitutionality of the warrantless 
search of the vehicle. Mr. Mann argued in his motion that the warrantless search could 
not be justified as a search incident to arrest or an inventory search. (R., pp.51–55.) The 
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State responded. (R., pp.94–94.) The district court did not rule on these issues or make 
any necessary factual findings. (See Tr., p.29, L.2–p.36, L.23 (resolving the suppression 
motion on standing grounds), p.37, L.17–p.39, L.21, p.61, L.6–p.63, L.23 (reopening the 
matter to consider legality of traffic stop only). To determine if the warrantless search of 
the vehicle was lawful—which the State has the burden to prove—Mr. Mann requests 
that the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress be vacated and the case be 
remanded for another suppression motion hearing. 
  
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury That The State Had To 




Mr. Mann submits that the district court’s supplemental jury Instruction No. 21 in 
response to the jury’s question resulted in the incorrect legal instruction on the requisite 
mental state for possession of drug paraphernalia, a specific intent crime. Instruction 
No. 21 informed the jury that possession of the paraphernalia in Idaho mattered, but the 
jurisdiction in which the defendant formed the intent to use the paraphernalia was not of 
legal significance. This instruction is incomplete and misleading. By instructing the jury 
that the formation of intent was irrelevant, Instruction No. 21 failed to properly answer 
the jury’s question as to the specific intent element of the offense and incorrectly 
instructed the jury as a matter of law. The State cannot show that this error was 
harmless. As such, Mr. Mann’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia should 
be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
“Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review.” State v. Hopkins, 158 Idaho 191, 195–96 (Ct. App. 
2015) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009)). The Court reviews “jury 
instructions as a whole because ‘[i]t is well established that [an] instruction may not be 
judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as 
a whole and the trial record.’” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472 (2012) (alteration in 
original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). 
When a defendant has objected to an instruction, [the Court] will 
apply the harmless error test articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
227 (2010). Typically, under the harmless error test, once the defendant 
shows that a constitutional violation occurred, the State has the burden of 
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not 
contribute to the jury’s verdict. Id. If the jury reached its verdict based on 
an erroneous instruction, [the Court] will generally vacate and remand for 
a new trial. Id. at 228. However, where the jury received proper instruction 
on all but one element of an offense, and where the Court “concludes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and 
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would 
have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly 
found to be harmless.” Id. (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79, 90 




C. The District Court Improperly Instructed The Jury By Eliminating An Essential 
Element Of The Offense 
 
Idaho Code § 37-2734A provides: “It is unlawful for any person to use, or to 
possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, 
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into 
the human body a controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2734A(1) (emphasis added). 
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Possession of drug paraphernalia is a specific intent crime. State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 
590, 592 (Ct. App. 2000). “[A] specific intent requirement refers to that state of mind 
which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof.” State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 
926 (1993) (quoting State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 768 (1976)). “Specific intent means a 
special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required 
with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” State v. Lopez, 126 Idaho 831, 833–34 
(Ct. App. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In contrast, “[a] general criminal 
intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the 
proscribed acts.” Fox, 124 Idaho at 183 (quoting Gowin, 97 Idaho at 767–68). As a 
specific intent crime, to establish a defendant’s guilt of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, the State must prove not only that the defendant possessed the item in 
question, but also that he intended to use it to introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body.2 Williams, 134 Idaho at 592. 
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of 
act and intent, or criminal negligence.” I.C. § 18-114. “A union of act and intent jury 
instruction should generally be given for a general-intent crime.” State v. Beeks, 159 
Idaho 223, 231 (Ct. App. 2015). A defendant is not entitled to a union of act and intent 
instruction for a specific intent crime, however. State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 900 
                                            
2 For example, in Williams, the Court of Appeals stated:  
 
The information charged that Williams “did possess with the intent to use 
drug paraphernalia, to wit: a spoon to prepare a controlled substance for 
intravenous use.” Thus, in order to establish Williams’ guilt of this offense, 
the State was required to prove not only that he possessed the small 
spoon in question but that he had intended to use it to prepare a controlled 
substance for intravenous introduction into the human body. 
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(Ct. App. 2002). A union of act and intent instruction is unnecessary for a specific intent 
crime where the jury is properly instructed on “the specific mental states required for the 
commission of these offenses.” Id. In other words, a union of act and intent is required
                                                                                                                                            
134 Idaho at 592. 
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for all offenses, but, if the jury is properly instructed on the “requisite mental elements” 
of a specific intent crime, a union of act and intent instruction is duplicative and 
superfluous. 
Here, Mr. Mann asserts that Instruction No. 21 improperly instructed the jury on 
the specific mental state required for possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury asked 
the district court if “intending to use” meant “use in Idaho” or “elsewhere.” (Aug. R., p.1.) 
The first two sentences of Instruction No. 21 are correct: (1) the possession of 
paraphernalia must occur in Idaho and (2) the defendant must intend to use the 
paraphernalia. (R., p.202.) But the third sentence—“It does not matter in which state the 
defendant formed the intent to use the paraphernalia”—is improper as a matter of law. 
(R., p.202.)  
Instruction No. 21 is improper because it failed to answer the jury’s question and 
confused the elements of the offense. The instruction refers to the formation of intent, 
but the formation of intent is not an element of the offense. This reference to “where the 
defendant formed the intent” is misleading. As a specific intent crime, what matters is 
whether the defendant had the intent to use the alleged paraphernalia to introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body in the jurisdiction in which he possessed the 
paraphernalia. In other words, the essential elements of the offense are satisfied by the 
act of possession joined with present intent to use in Idaho. See I.C. § 18-114 (requiring 
a union of act and intent for all crimes); see also State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 872 
(Ct. App. 2001) (“In a criminal prosecution, the State must prove subject matter 
jurisdiction by showing that an essential element of the offense occurred within Idaho.”). 
The district court should have referred the jury to the original instruction on possession 
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of drug paraphernalia, R., p.191, or simply reiterated that State must prove Mr. Mann 
had the intent to use the bong in Idaho to introduce a controlled substance into the 
body. By referring to the formation of intent, and not the present intent to use in Idaho, 
Instruction No. 21 erroneously signaled to the jury that a determination of the requisite 
mental state at the time of the criminal act did not matter. Thus, Instruction No. 21 
improperly instructed the jury on the specific mental state required for possession of 
drug paraphernalia.  
 “An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an 
element of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, or 
as a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.” State v. Parsons, 153 
Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 
588 (2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007)). Here, Instruction No. 21 
relieved the State of its burden to prove specific intent, and Mr. Mann objected to the 
instruction. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1–7.) The burden then shifts to the State to establish 
harmlessness. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 472. Mr. Mann asserts that the State cannot meet 
this burden. The erroneous mental state element was neither “uncontested” nor 
“supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the 
same absent the error.” Id. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the jury was not 
convinced by State’s evidence of intent in light of its questions to the district court. (Aug. 
R., p.1.) Because the jury reached its verdict based on an erroneous instruction, 
Mr. Mann submits that his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia should be 
vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Mann respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings on his 
motion to suppress, including a determination of whether the search of the rental car 
was lawful. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and remand the case for a new trial. 
 DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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